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I. ISSUE AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION
A. Issue*
This memorandum addresses whether the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (“ECCC”) should exclude evidence of the Khmer Rouge’s command structure that
was obtained from members of the Khmer Rouge that were denounced, tortured, and
subsequently killed.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. Interrogation prior to certain torture within the confines of Tuol Sleng
rises to the level of suffering required to constitute torture.
The statements in question resulted from severe mental torture that took place
immediately before obvious physical abuse was going to commence. The knowledge that actual
physical torture was about to begin is of sufficient gravity to constitute the level of mental pain
and suffering necessary to constitute torture.
2. The international prohibition against torture and the status of torture as
jus cogens bars the admission of any evidence derived from torture
regardless of its benefit.
The ban against torture and its products has gained the status of jus cogens and is a
peremptory norm. This means that derogating from the norm is a violation of international law.
The use of evidence gathered through torture would plainly violate international law.

*

Should the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia be allowed to admit evidence of the Khmer
Rouge’s command structure that was obtained from the torture of prisoners, that were subsequently killed, at Tuol
Sleng?

1

3. All of the international and hybrid courts have rules of procedure
banning evidence resulting from torture.
Each international tribunal and hybrid tribunal has rules prohibiting the admission of
evidence gained from torture. Nothing in this case justifies deviating from these traditional rules.
4. The analogy to the Miranda exception does not support the contention
that evidence of the Khmer Rouge command structure should be admissible.
Miranda rights do not protect individuals from basic processing questions police officers
may ask in trying to identify the person. For example, an officer may ask a person to identify
himself by name or provide his address. Presumably, a prisoner’s rank and serial number would
also fall under this exception. However, substantive evidence cannot be admitted into court if
the suspect’s Miranda rights were not read first. Procedurally, the Miranda rights must be read
when the suspect is in custody and prior to formal interrogation.
The Miranda exception analogy does not support the idea that the Khmer Rouge
command structure evidence should be admissible because the evidence is substantive and the
victims were detained and interrogated. Questioning relating to the command structure of the
Khmer Rouge crosses the line from processing information – such as identifying the prisoner - to
substantive evidence because the purpose of such questions is to uncover the names of the
prisoner’s superiors, which does not help to identify the actual prisoner. Furthermore, once a
prisoner is detained for interrogation, he is entitled to be read his Miranda rights without
exception. This would apply to each of the prisoners at Tuol Sleng if U.S. law controlled.

2

5. Even if the use of medical information obtained from Nazi medical
experiments suggests that the evidence in question can be admitted (which it
does not) the evidence in question should still be barred because there is no
immediate benefit to the public.
The general consensus is that it is unethical to use information gained from Nazi medical
experiments.

Although, some have argued that this information should be utilized if an

immediate benefit to the public exists, no such benefit exists here. The prosecution of the Khmer
Rouge leadership may help heal Cambodia as a nation, but it will not provide an immediate
public benefit. For example, polls the Allied forces conducted in Germany during Nuremburg
showed that the trial had no immediate soothing effect on the German people.1
6. The statutory canon of construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius
supports the contention that Article 15 of the Convention against Torture is
meant to exclude evidence gained from torture, except as to prove the
existence of torture.
There are two principle reasons to exclude evidence gained from torture. First, evidence
gained from torture is considered unreliable. Even though the statements the prosecution wants
to use were not made under actual physical torture, they were made under intense mental pain
and suffering, which is considered torture. Even if some of the statements made under torture
corroborate one another, they were still made under torture and are inherently unreliable.
Second, torture has often been used to ensure evidence in judicial proceedings.

If

statements made under torture cannot be invoked, then an important reason for using torture is
removed. Even if preventing the admission of torture evidence would hinder the prosecution of
those who are responsible for facilitating the crimes of the Khmer Rouge, torture is banned

1

Christoph Burchard, The Nuremburg Trial and its Impact on Germany, 4 J. Int’l Crim. L. 800, 812-13 (2006)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 35].

3

because as a peremptory norm it is fundamentally wrong. Allowing torture evidence in some
situations, but not others, leaves open the possibility that more evidence from torture can be used
in future cases, thus encouraging an increase in torture in the future. In other words, creating an
exception in this case could lead to future exceptions that would risk swallowing the rule. This is
a slippery slop indeed.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Khmer Rouge was one of the most brutal regimes in modern history. Between 1975
and 1979 as many as two million people– nearly one-third of the Cambodian population - died
under the Khmer Rouge.2 Anywhere, from 500,000 to one million of these deaths were the
result of executions, many of which occurred when the Khmer Rouge turned on its own party
members.3 In 1976, Pol Pot, Nuon Chea, and Son Sen, members of the Khmer Rouge Central
Committee, believed a conspiracy against their leadership existed within their party. They
subsequently adopted a policy to execute all those within the party who could be compelled to
confess to this conspiracy.4 The policy was implemented at Tuol Sleng prison, also known as S21. Kang Kech Eav, more commonly known as Duch, ran Tuol Sleng where at least 14,000
people were executed, many of whom were killed only after being tortured.5

2

Stephen Heder, Seven Candidates for Prosecution: Accountability for the Crimes of the Khmer Rouge, at 7 (2001)
available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/khmerrouge.html [reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 41].
3

Id.

4

Id. at 26.

5

Id. at 12.

4

The Khmer Rouge leadership was an extremely secretive body that determined “through
secrecy […] we can be masters of the situation and win victory over the enemy, who cannot find
out who is who.”6 As a result of the leadership’s paranoia, uncovering the command structure of
the Khmer Rouge, as well as individual culpability, has proven difficult. When Vietnam invaded
Cambodia in 1979, the Khmer Rouge leadership burned most of their own documents that could
have tied them to their crimes.7 Consequently, much of the evidence about the Khmer Rouge
and its command structure that exists today comes from the torture confessions of prisoners at
Tuol Sleng because Duch claims that he was never told to burn his files.8 In addition to these
torture confessions, Duch has since admitted on more than one occasion to being personally
responsible for torturing and murdering prisoners at Tuol Sleng.9

In fact, he said that he

received orders from the central committee and was willing to stand trial for his actions.10

6

John D. Clioreiari & Youk Chhang, Documenting the Crimes of Democratic Kampuchea, in Bringing the Khmer
Rouge to Justice: Prosecuting Mass Violence before the Cambodian Courts 225 (Jaya Ramji & Beth Van Schaack
eds., 2005) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 39].
7

Id. at 26-27.

8

Id. at 27. In an interview with Duch after Vietnam toppled the Khmer Rouge, Duch recalled a conversation he had
with Nuon Chea where Nuon Chea told Duch that “all the papers from the party were burned except yours. You are
stupid.”
9

Seth Mydans, Khmer Rouge Executioner Found, Willing to Stand Trial, Chic. Trib., Apr. 30, 1999, at 22
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 43].
10

Id.

5

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Interrogation prior to certain torture within the confines of Tuol Sleng rises to
the level of “severity” as is required to constitute torture.
The statements in question resulted from severe mental torture made immediately before
obvious physical abuse was going to commence. The principle question here is whether the
knowledge that actual physical torture was about to begin, which would lead to death, is of
sufficient gravity to constitute the level of mental pain and suffering that constitutes torture. The
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(“CAT”) defines torture as an act that is intentionally inflicted on a person by which severe pain
or suffering, either physical or mental, is used to obtain information from that person.11
In determining the severity of a case, a court often look to the duration of the treatment,
its physical or mental effects, and in some cases the sex, age, and state of health of the victim.12
In the United States’ Military Commissions Manuel, the U.S. military defines severe mental pain
or suffering as the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from:
“(a) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or
suffering; (b) the administration or application, or threatened administration or
application, of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt
profoundly the senses or the personality; (c) the threat of imminent death; or (d)
the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe
physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering
11

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 1, para. 1,
G.A. Res. 46, at 197, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter CAT]
(“torture” means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on
a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing from him or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
12

Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 162 (1978) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 21].

6

substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or
personality.”13
The European Court of Human Rights, referring to Article 3 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“European
Convention”), stated in Soering v. United Kingdom that the “Convention is a living instrument
which … must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions,”14 implying that what did
not rise to the level of torture in the past could rise to the level of torture today.15 In other
words, acts that were once considered cruel, degrading, or inhuman in the late 1970’s could be
considered torture today.16 The court in Selmouni v. France found that acts, which would
arouse in the victim feelings of fear, anguish, humiliation, and inferiority, which could possibly
break the plaintiff’s physical and moral resistance could reach the level of torture.17 In Soering
v. United Kingdom, the court determined that waiting on death row with the ever present specter
13

United States Military Commission Manual, at Sec. IV-9 (Jan. 18, 2007) available at
http://www.fcnl.org/pdfs/Torture/Military_Commissions_Manual.pdf [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 44].
14

Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, ¶ 102 (1989) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 31].

15

Selmouni v. France, App. No. 25803/94, Eur. Comm’n H.R. ¶ 101 (1999) [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 29].

16

See Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 96 (five actions which were not considered torture because they were not intense
enough were (a) wall standing: forcing the detainees to remain for periods of some hours in a "stress position' ... ; (b)
hooding: putting a black or navy colored bag over the detainees' heads and, at least initially, keeping it there all the
time except during interrogation; (c) subjection to noise: pending their interrogations, holding the detainees in a
room where there was a continuous loud and hissing noise; (d) deprivation of sleep: pending their interrogations,
depriving the detainees of sleep; (e) deprivation of food and drink: subjecting the detainees to a reduced diet during
their stay at the centre and pending interrogations); See also HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v.
Israel [1999], ¶. 24-32, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/eng/verdict/framesetSrch.html (search "Parties" for
"Public Committee Against Torture in Israel," then click on search) (methods such as covering one’s head with a
burlap bag that causes suffocation, playing loud music, intentional sleep deprivation, and uncomfortable detention
were inhuman, but not torture) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tabs 21, 20 respectively].
17

Selmouni, App. No. 25803/94, Eur. Comm’n H.R. ¶¶ 99, 105; See also, Aydin v. Turkey, App. No.
57/1996/676/866, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 84 (1997) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tabs 29, 15 respectively].

7

of death hanging over one’s head created “mounting anguish” in violation of Article 3 of the
European Convention.18
At Tuol Sleng, Khmer Rouge members were brought to a prison that was known for its
brutality. The fact that Khmer Rouge members were shackled to beds in blood stained rooms at
Tuol Sleng and asked questions with knowledge that certain pain, suffering, and death was
imminent, rises to the level of severe mental pain or suffering. Therefore, any information gained
through interrogation before physical torture began should still be deemed inadmissible.
B. The international prohibition against torture and the status of torture as jus
cogens bars the admission of any evidence derived from torture regardless of its
benefit.
The international revulsion towards torture is captured in numerous international
conventions and the prohibition against torture is considered an international peremptory norm.
In A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department the court thoroughly analyzed the
status of torture under international law and the court’s reasoning supports the proposition that
torture evidence is inadmissible.19
1. International prohibition against torture and torture’s status as jus
cogens
After the end of World War II, the community of nations, shocked by the horrors and
atrocities of the holocaust, attempted “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights” through the

18

Soering 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 111 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 31].

19

A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2), [2005] UKHL 71, ¶¶ 27-39 (U.K)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

8

United Nations Charter.20 This reaffirmation was expanded in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which stated with no ambiguity that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”21 This precept was also incorporated
into the European Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”), which also forbade the use of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.22
These international instruments laid the groundwork for the adoption of the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1987.23 Not only
did the CAT define torture,24 and expressly forbid it,25 but Article 15 also clearly states that
evidence gained from torture may not be used in any proceedings, except to prove the existence

20

U.N. Charter preamble [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 11].

21

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 21A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc
A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12].

22

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, art. 3, entered into
force Sept. 3, 1953, as amended by Protocols Nos 3, 5, 8, and 11 which entered into force on 21 September 1970, 20
December 1971, 1 January 1990, and 1 November 1998 respectively; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), art. 7, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S.
171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 [hereinafter ICCPR] [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tabs 3, 5
respectively].
23

CAT, supra, note 11 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

24

Id. at art. 1. (For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
2].

25

Id. art. 2 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

9

of torture.26

In A and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, the court

interpreted Article 15 as an absolute bar to the use of torture evidence in judicial proceedings.27
Two international conventions,28 case law,29 various national legal systems,30 and six
international criminal tribunals31 all condemn torture and prohibit the use of evidence gained
therefrom in any legal proceedings. This raises the use of evidence gained from torture and the
ban on torture itself to the level of jus cogens, and creates a peremptory norm of international
law, which makes derogation from those norms forbidden.32 Furthermore, the prohibition of
torture as a jus cogens was recognized in several cases. In R v Evans ex p Pinochet Ugarte the

26

Id. art. 15 (Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as a result of
torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence
that the statement was made) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
27

28

A and Others, [2005] UKHL 71, ¶35 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
Infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.

29

A and Others, [2005] UKHL 71; See also infra notes 33, 35 and accompanying text [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
30

Infra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.

31

Infra notes 63-77 and accompanying text.

32

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332. ([A] norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; The court in Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina stated that
“Jus cogens embraces customary laws considered binding on all nations and is derived from values taken to be
fundamental by the international community, rather than from the fortuitous or self-interested choices of nations.
Whereas customary international law derives solely from the consent of states, the fundamental and universal norms
constituting jus cogens transcend such consent. These norms, which include principles and rules concerning the
basic rights of the human person, are the concern of all states; they are obligations erga omnes…” and “[B]ecause
jus cogens norms do not depend solely on the consent of states for their binding force, they enjoy the highest status
within international law. The supremacy of jus cogens extends over all rules of international law; norms that have
attained the status of jus cogens prevail over and invalidate international agreements and other rules of international
law in conflict with them. A jus cogens norm is subject to modification or derogation only by a subsequent jus
cogens norm.” Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992); See also, A and
Others, [2005] UKHL 71 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tabs 13, 30, 14 respectively].
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court explicitly recognized that torture had reached the level of jus cogens.33 In fact, the court
stated that the express purpose of the CAT was to create an international system to prosecute acts
of torture.34 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) also
explicitly stated in Prosecutor v. Furundzija that torture “has evolved into a peremptory norm or
jus cogens, that is, a norm that enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law
and even ‘ordinary’ customary rules.”35 As a signatory to the ICCPR and the CAT, Cambodia is
bound to prevent torture in all its forms, as well as prohibit the submission of evidence gained
from torture into legal proceedings.
2. Exclusionary principle of the Convention against Torture: Article 15
In the seminal work on understanding the United Nations Convention against Torture,
Herman Burges and Hans Danelius explained that the exclusionary rule of Article 15 was based
on two principles.36 First, the authors noted that a statement made under torture is contrary to the
fundamental principle of a “fair trial” and is often unreliable. Indeed, the authors suggested that
Article 15 was meant to be a check on legal systems where court procedures are based on the
free evaluation of evidence so as to bar any statements or evidence gained from torture from

33

R v Evans and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3), 6 BHRC 24, 11 (March 24, 1999); See also Siderman de
Blake, 965 F. 2d at 717 (“the right to be free from official torture is fundamental and universal, a right deserving of
the highest status under international law, a norm of jus cogens”) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tabs 27, 30 respectively].

34

R v Evans and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3), 6 BHRC 24, 12 (March 24, 1999) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 27].

35

Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber, Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Dec.
10, 1998) ¶ 153 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 26].

36

Herman Burges and Hans Danelius, The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Handbook on the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 148 (Martinus
Nijhoff 1988) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 38].
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being heard in court, preventing judges and jurors from even having the opportunity to weigh its
inclusion or exclusion.37 Second, the authors reasoned that excluding evidence gained from
torture from judicial proceedings would indirectly prevent torture in the first place because if the
evidence gained through torture cannot be utilized an important reason for using torture is
nullified.38
Additionally, while Article 7 of the ICCPR does not contain the same exclusionary
provisions as Article 15 of the CAT, it has nonetheless been interpreted to bar torture evidence.39
The Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR has specifically stated that “it is important for the
discouragement of violations under Article 7 that the law must prohibit the use of admissibility
in judicial proceedings of statements or confessions obtained through torture or other prohibited
treatment.”40
Lastly, the interpretation of the Convention against Torture under Article 31, Article
31(3)(c) and Article 53 of the Vienna Convention supports the exclusionary principle of CAT
Article 15 and forbids the ECCC from reading a new exception into the Convention against
Torture.

37

Id; See also Chris Ingelse, The UN Committee against Torture: An Assessment 380 (Kluwer Law 2001)
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tabs 38, 42 respectively].
38

Burges and Danelius, supra note 36, at 148 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 38].

39

Ingelse, supra note 37, at 382 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 42].

40

Id. citing General Comment 20 on Article 7, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994), p.30, §12 [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 42].
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a) Interpreting the Convention Against Torture Under Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention requires that “a treaty shall be interpreted…in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty and…in the light of
its object and purpose.”41 The “ordinary” meaning of Article 15 is to ban the submission of any
statement gathered from torture, except to prove that the statement was made under torture.42
The 1975 Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“1975 Declaration”), the
precursor to the CAT, had no exception to the rule.43 It was not until the CAT negotiations that
the contracting parties decided to add one exception,44 which shows that the “ordinary” meaning
of Article 15 was to bar all torture evidence except to prove torture’s existence.
The leading authorities on the CAT, Mr. Burges and Mr. Danelius, stated that the
“purpose” of Article 15 is “not to prove that the statement is a true statement,” but to prove that a
statement was said under torture.45 It is clear from these leading authorities that interpreting the
CAT under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention would lead to the same conclusion that Article
15’s “ordinary” meaning and “purpose” is to prevent the submission of any torture evidence
except to prove that torture existed. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention can not to be invoked to

41

42

43

44

45

Vienna Convention, supra note 32, art. 31 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
CAT, supra note 11, art. 15 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
Burges and Danelius, supra note 36, at 148 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 38].
Id.
Id.
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justify reading another exception into Article 15 that would allow the submission of a torture
statement’s substance because that is explicitly not the “object” or “purpose” of Article 15.
Therefore, the submission of the Khmer Rouge command structure into the ECCC would be in
violation of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.
b) Interpreting the Convention Against Torture Under Article
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention states that when “interpreting a treaty a party
shall take into consideration, together with the context, any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties.”46 The European Court of Human Rights in AlAdsani v. UK stated that the European Convention could not be interpreted in a vacuum and that
courts need to be aware of the convention’s “special character as a human rights treaty.”47
Additionally, the European Convention must take into account relevant rules of international law
and “be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms a part.”48
The analysis in Al-Adsani is theoretically interchangeable with any human rights treaty and since
the CAT is a human rights treaty the CAT must be interpreted in harmony with international law.
International law clearly states that the use of evidence gathered through torture is inadmissible
in criminal proceedings.49 Therefore, any use of evidence gathered through torture other than to
prove that torture existed would violate international law.

46

Vienna Convention, supra note 32, art. 31(3)(c) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13].

47

Al-Adsani v. UK, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 35763/97 para. 55 (2001) cited in A and Others v. Secretary of State for
the Home Department, [2005] UKHL 71, ¶ 29 (U.K.) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
48

Id.

49

See supra, notes 29, 36-40 and accompanying text; See infra notes 53-77 and accompanying text.
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c) Interpreting the Convention Against Torture Under Article 53 of
the Vienna Convention
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention defined an international peremptory norm as a
“norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.”50 Under well-established principles of
international law the only way to allow evidence gained from torture into proceedings is to use
the evidence to prove that the evidence was gained through torture. If the ECCC wanted to use
the substantive information gathered through torture there would first have to be another
preemptory norm allowing the use of substantive information gained through torture to be
admissible in court in order to go after not just the torturer, but others. However, no such norm
exists and if the ECCC did submit the substance as evidence they would violate fundamental
principles of international and human rights law,51 which in turn would make the proceedings of
the ECCC questionable and the results laughable.
The international community has placed torture on the same plane as genocide and
slavery because of its abhorrence. Regardless of whether or not evidence gathered through
torture would help prosecute vile suspects, the use of torture evidence is a “moral defilement”52
and degradation that would help to justify and condone torture, not condemn it, and this would
violate fundamental human rights and international law.

50

Vienna Convention, supra note 32 , art. 53 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 13].

51

Id.

52

People v. (at the suit of the A-G) v. O’Brien, IR 142 (1965) cited in A and Others v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department, [2005] UKHL 71, ¶ 39 (U.K.) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
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3. States have adopted domestic laws similar to Article 15 of the Convention
against Torture
Many nations have adopted domestic laws similar to Article 15. Canada embodied
Article 15 in its criminal code,53 while France54 and Germany55 gave Article 15 legal affect
through court decisions. Spain56 and The Netherlands57 also determined that witness statements
obtained through torture could not be used as evidence. The High Court of Australia stated that
“convictions obtained by the aid of unlawful or unfair acts may be obtained at too high a
price.”58 The courts in the U.S. have also adopted prohibitions against the use of torture. In
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the court decried that the “torturer has become like the pirate and slave
trader before him hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”59 Likewise, the court in
LaFrance v. Bohlinger foreshadowed Article15 when it stated that it would be “unthinkable that
a statement obtained by torture or by other conduct belonging only in a police state should be
admitted at the government’s behest in order to bolster its case.”60

53

India v. Singh, 108 CCC (3d) 274, ¶ 20 (1996) citied in A and Others, [2005] UKHL 71, para. 27 [reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
54

French Republic v. Haramboure, No de pourvoi 94-81254, (Jan 24, 1995) cited in A and Others, [2005] UKHL
71, ¶ 37 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
55

El Motassadeq, 2005 NJW 2326, para. 2 (June 14, 2005) cited in A and Others, [2005] UKHL 71, ¶ 37
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

56

Le Ministere Public v. Irastorza Dorronsoro, No 238/2003 (May 16, 2003) cited in A and Others, [2005] UKHL
71, ¶ 39 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14]. [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
14].
57

Pereira, nr 103.094, para. 6.2 (Oct 1, 1996) cited in A and Others, [2005] UKHL 71, ¶ 37 [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 14]. [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

58

A and Others, [2005] UKHL 71, ¶ 17 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].

59

Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2nd Cir. 1980) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19].

60

LaFrance v. Bohlinger, 499 F.2d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 1974) cited in A and Others, [2005] UKHL 71, ¶ 38 [reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 14].
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The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) explained in its advisory opinion on the Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, that the world
has an obligation not to recognize the outcome of an illegal situation, nor should the world offer
aid or assistance in maintaining such a situation.61 Since the ban of evidence gained from torture
has reached jus cogens status, any derogation from this fundamental rule would seem to be a
violation of international law.62
The international community’s placement of torture on the same high level as its
prohibition against genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, aggression, and acquisition of
territory by force demonstrates the world’s revulsion to torture in all its forms. Allowing the use
of evidence gained through torture in an international criminal trial would be utterly
unacceptable.
C. All of the international and hybrid courts have rules of procedure banning
evidence resulting from torture.
Each international tribunal and hybrid tribunal has rules prohibiting the admission of
evidence gained from torture.

61

The Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion,
2004 I.C.J. ¶ 159 (July 9) (the court’s opinion was in respect to Israel’s construction of a wall on Occupied
Palestinian Territory) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
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Therefore, under the ICJ opinion the world would have a duty to not recognize the outcome of an ECCC case nor
provide further aid or assistance to the ECCC if it were to admit into the proceedings evidence gained from torture.
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1. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
Rule 95 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure forbids the use of evidence “obtained by
methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its admission is antithetical to, and
would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings.”63 Even if evidence had probative
value it would still be excluded under Rule 95 if its inclusion would affect the integrity of the
proceedings, especially if it were “obtained by means contrary to internationally protected
human rights.”64 Additionally, even evidence gained from oppressive conduct, not constituting
torture, would be inadmissible under Rule 95.65 The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Delalic
stated that oppressive conduct is conduct that can drain the concentration and free will of a
person under interrogation through acts that can weaken one’s resistance causing one to be
unable to think clearly.66 The act of torturing someone is not only contrary to human rights, but
is also an oppressive act and would negatively affect the integrity of the proceedings.
2. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s (“ICTR”) Rules of Procedure and
Evidence are almost identical to those of the ICTY. ICTR Rule 95 states that evidence shall be

63

International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, Rules of Procedure and
Evidence Rule, Rule 95, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 38 (as amended) (2006) (“No evidence shall be admissible if
obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its admission is antithetical to, and would
seriously damage, the integrity of proceedings.”) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7].

64

Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on Zdravko Mucic’s Motion for the Exclusion of
Evidence (Trial Chamber, Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Sept. 2, 1997) ¶ 35 [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 25].

65

Id. ¶ 41.

66

Id. ¶ 66.
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inadmissible if it is “obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its
admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings.67
Aside from the fact that evidence gained through torture is inherently unreliable, admitting such
evidence is antithetical to international criminal rules of procedure, which are beholden to
international norms, one of which is the ban on torture.
3. International Criminal Court
The International Criminal Court (“ICC”), which was created with the adoption of the
Rome Statute in 1998, has an even more comprehensive exclusionary rule.68 Article 69(7) of the
Rome Statute forbids the use of any “evidence obtained by means of a violation of …
internationally recognized human rights … if: (a) The violation casts substantial doubt on the
reliability of the evidence; or (b) The admission of the evidence would be antithetical to and
would seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings.”69 While similar to the rules in the
ICTY and ICTR, the ICC explicitly states that evidence gained at the expense of human rights is

67

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 95, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.1
(1995) (“Exclusion of Evidence on the Grounds of the Means by which it was Obtained No evidence shall be
admissible if obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its admission is antithetical to,
and would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings”) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
6].

68

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, united nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) [reproduced
in the accompanying notebook at Tab 9].

69

Id. art. 69(7) (“Evidence obtained by means of a violation of this Statute or internationally recognized human
rights shall not be admissible if : (a) The violation casts substantial doubt on the reliability of the evidence; or (b)
The admission of the evidence would be antithetical to and would seriously damage the integrity of the
proceedings”).
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inadmissible, whereas the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Delalic had to imply that Rule 95 of
the ICTY banned evidence gained from violations of human rights.70
4. United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor
The United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor (“UNTAET”) created the
most detailed exclusionary rule to date.71 Section 34.2 of the UNTAET’s Transitional Rules of
Criminal Procedure forbids the use of evidence if it was obtained through methods that call into
question the reliability of the evidence, or if its admission is antithetical to, and would seriously
damage, the integrity of the proceedings. Specifically enumerated in this section is that, without
limitation, no evidence obtained through torture, coercion or threats to moral or physical
integrity” can be admitted.72 These rules clearly forbid the use of evidence gained from torture.
5. Special Court for Sierra Leone
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) has a broader exclusionary rule to the
effect that evidence shall be excluded “if its admission would bring the administration of justice
into serious disrepute.”73 However, the SCSL also adopted the Rules of Procedure of the ICTR
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Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on Zdravko Mucic’s Motion for the Exclusion of
Evidence (Trial Chamber, Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Sept. 2, 1997) ¶ 35 [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 25].

71

On Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedure, UNTAET/Reg/2000/30 (Sept. 25, 2000) ¶ 34 [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 8].

72

Id. para. 34.2. (“The Court may exclude any evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect, or is unnecessarily cumulative with other evidence No evidence shall be admitted if obtained by
methods that cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its admission is antithetical to, and would seriously
damage, the integrity of the proceedings, including without limitation evidence obtained through torture, coercion or
threats to moral or physical integrity”).
73

Special Court for Sierra Leone, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 95 (Mar. 7, 2003) (“No evidence shall be
admitted if its admission would bring the administration of justice into serious disrepute”) [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
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mutatis mutandis,74 which means that the ICTR Rules of Procedure apply along with any
changes required for the running of the SCSL. Because, the SCSL adopted the evidentiary rules
of the ICTR it is understood that Rule 95 of the SCSL will have the same meaning as Rule 95 of
the ICTR.
6. Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
To date, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”) has not
adopted final rules relating to evidence and procedure. Nevertheless, Rule 26(3) of the draft
internal rules does mention an aversion to the use of coercive techniques towards interviewees.75
The internal rules state that any information gained through coercion or threat will be considered
inadmissible as evidence in the ECCC.76 While the draft internal rules govern information
gained from an interviewee, they provide no criteria for selecting who qualifies as an
interviewee.77 It is likely, based on the other international criminal tribunals’ rules for evidence
exclusion that similar rules prohibiting the admission of evidence gained from torture would
apply in the ECCC as well.
Based on the myriad of international criminal tribunals and their rules of procedure it is
clear that the overwhelming theme of their exclusionary rules is to protect the integrity of the
74

Agreement on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN-Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002,UN Doc.
S/2002/246, Annex, art. 14(1) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1].

75

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Draft Internal Rules, Rule 26(3) (Nov. 3, 2006) (“No form of
inducement, physical coercion or threats thereof, whether directed against the interviewee or others, may be used in
any interview. If such inducements, coercion or threats are used, the statements recorded shall not be admissible as
evidence before the Chambers, and the person responsible shall be appropriately disciplined in accordance with
Rules [39 to 42]”) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
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Id.

77

Id.
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judicial proceedings. The primary means of doing this is to bar any evidence that was gained
from the violation of a person’s human rights and one such fundamental human right is the right
to be free from torture. Therefore, the international tribunals understand that evidence gained
from torture must be excluded lest the tribunals themselves become tarnished with the taint of
torture.
D. The analogy to the Miranda exception does not support the contention that
evidence of the Khmer Rouge command structure should be admissible.
The Miranda rule is a procedure that provides safeguards in order to protect information
that would be considered testimonial, which means information that implicitly or explicitly
relates to a factual assertion or disclosure of information.78 This particularly relates to the
privilege of being spared from revealing one’s thoughts or views with the government.79
1. The Miranda rule
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Miranda v. Arizona established the basic guidelines for
protecting a suspect’s rights by requiring certain procedural safeguards during a custodial
interrogation.80 Custodial interrogation is defined as questioning initiated after security officers
take a person into custody or otherwise deprive a person of his freedom of action in any
significant way.81

“The Miranda safeguards come into play when a person in custody is
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Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 18].

79

Id. at 213.

80

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23].

81

Id.
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subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.”82 The functional equivalent
to express questioning refers to “any words or actions on the part of the police that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” 83 The
functional equivalent portion of this “definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the
suspect, rather than the intent of the police.”84

Additionally, courts have determined that

custodial interrogation for the purposes of Miranda includes a security officer using his
knowledge of any special susceptibilities of the suspect as leverage against the accused.85 The
result of a Miranda violation is that any testimonial evidence gained from interrogation is
suppressed at trial.86
However, courts in the U.S have determined that the Miranda shield does not suppress
information that is gained from “routine” booking questions.87

Such questions involve

requesting information for basic identification purposes to secure the “biographical data
necessary to complete booking”88 of the accused regardless of whether it occurred during
custodial interrogation.89

In Miranda, the Court stated that information gathered from
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Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 28].
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Id.
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Id.
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Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966); See also Muniz, 496 U.S. at 590 [reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tabs 23, 24 respectively].
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United States v. Sims, 719 F.2d 375, 378 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1034, 79 L. Ed. 703, 104 S. Ct. 1304
(1984) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 34].

88

United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181, note 2 (8th Cir. 1989) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 32].
89

United States v. McLaughlin, 777 F.2d 388, 391 (8th Cir. 1985); See also Sims, 719 F.2d [reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tabs 33, 34 respectively].
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fingerprinting, photographing, measuring, writings, and speech were all allowable means of
ascertaining the identification of the accused without requiring the reading of the accused’
Miranda rights.90
2. The command structure evidence is not included within the scope of the
Miranda exception for basic questions.
Even if the ECCC adopted an evidentiary rule similar to the U.S. Miranda rights
exception, the information about the Khmer Rouge’s command structure obtained at Tuol Sleng
should still be excluded for two reasons. First, the information about the Khmer Rouge’s
command structure is not “routine” booking information necessary for identification, but
testimonial, and would be suppressed at trial unless the prisoner was read his Miranda rights
before being interrogated.91 Secondly, the information was gathered during a custodial
interrogation because the Khmer Rouge detained the victims at a government run prison camp92
and the guards used their knowledge of the victims’ fears of imminent torture and death as
leverage against the victims to gain information.93 Since the Miranda safeguards come into play
when a person undergoes custodial interrogation, the victims at Tuol Sleng would require
protection under the Miranda rules.94 Any information gathered from the victims at Tuol Sleng
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Miranda, 384 U.S. at 764; See also Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601-02 (1990) (stating that the seven questions regarding
the defendant’s name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age do not qualify as custodial
interrogation afforded protection under the defendant’s Miranda rights) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tabs 23, 24 respectively].
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Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 18].
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Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
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Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
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Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 28].
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would be suppressed under the Miranda rule if such a rule existed at the ECCC because of the
testimonial nature of the information and the process in which the information was gained.
However, as noted above, Miranda protections are inapplicable when security officers
ask suspects basic processing questions in order to identify the suspect, like name and address
without informing the suspect of her Miranda rights. Evidence about the command structure of
the Khmer Rouge crosses the line from processing information, identifying the prisoner, to
substantive testimonial evidence because it is uncovering the names of the prisoner’s superiors,
which does not help to identify the actual prisoner. Since the information is not for suspect
identification, but testimonial information, Miranda v. Arizona forbids the submission of that
information into court as evidence if the suspect’s Miranda rights were not read first.95
Therefore, even if the ECCC adopted a Miranda analogy, the analogy does not support the notion
that the Khmer Rouge command structure evidence should be admissible because the
information was gained through custodial interrogation and the information gathered was not for
prisoner identification.
E. Even if the use of medical information obtained from Nazi medical experiments
suggests that the evidence in question can be admitted (which it does not) the
evidence in question should still be barred because there is no immediate benefit to
the public.
During the horrific years of Nazi rule, barbarous Nazi doctors used live humans to
conduct scientific experiments. At the Nuremburg trial, 20 of these doctors were tried for war
crimes and crimes against humanity. The debate over whether to use material gained from these
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Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
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“scientific” experiments has parallels to whether evidence gained through torture should be
admitted before the ECCC.
1. Medical information obtained from Nazi human medical experiments
violates international medical ethics and is generally barred from use
At Nuremburg, the foundation of the international norms dealing with human
experimentation was established with the creation of the Nuremburg Code.96 The Nuremburg
Code includes two basic rules; (1) informed consent of the human is required before
experimentation; and (2) research is not justified solely because the subject gave consent.97 The
requirement of informed consent was later codified in Article 7 of the ICCPR,98 which now
means that informed consent is a requirement under international law.99
Researchers have tried to use information gained from Nazi medical experiments in the
past, but they have been harshly criticized and much of their research was never published.100
For instance, Doctor Robert Pozos, Director of the Hypothermia Laboratory at the University of
Minnesota, attempted to use information that Nazi doctors got from freezing concentration camp
prisoners to death. When he tried to publish his research with this information included, the New
England Journal of Medicine rejected the work.101
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Joanne Roman, U.S. Medical Research in the Developing World: Ignoring Nuremburg, 11 Cornell J. L. & Pub.
Pol'y 441, 448 (2002) [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 36].
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Id. at 449.
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ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 7 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
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Roman, supra note 96, at 450 [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 36].
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Baruch C. Cohen, The Ethics of Using Medical Data from Nazi Experiments, available at
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/naziexp.html [reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 40].
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Id.
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General Telford Taylor, Chief Counsel for the prosecution at Nuremberg argued that the
Nazi experiments were insufficient and unscientific, “a ghostly failure as well as a hideous crime
… those experiments revealed nothing which civilized medicine can use.”102 All of the subjects
in these cases were malnourished, dehydrated, starving, skeletons of men and women who
resemble nothing of today’s masses, which such information is only arguably capable of helping.
The editor of the New England Journal of Medicine stated that the experiments were such a
“gross violation of human standards that they are not to be trusted at all.”103 Additionally, famed
Harvard Medical School Doctor, Henry Beecher, said that Nazi information should be treated
like unconstitutionally obtained evidence, that is, it should be inadmissible in any form in today’s
society.104
2. The analogy to evidence gained through torture is that both violate
ethical, moral, and international norms and cannot be used
Both the Nazi information and the evidence at issue here were gathered using torture. The
use of such information would be to bring justification to the horrific acts because its use
legitimizes the means by which they were achieved. Regardless of the good that using this
evidence might bring, the ends do not justify the means, especially when the means violate
fundamental principles of human rights and decency.
With regard to the Nazi medical data, some have argued that ends justify the means if the
greater good is served. Putting aside all the moral, ethical, and legal condemnations of using the
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Nazi medical information and assuming that the Nazi information should be allowed into the
scientific arena if it could save lives, this situation just does not exist in relation to the facts we
are concerned with in Cambodia. While the prosecutions of the Khmer Rouge leadership will go
a long way to help heal Cambodia as a nation,105 they will not save lives or bring back those who
were killed. Moreover, the exclusion of evidence gained from torture in cases before the ECCC
will not prohibit justice from being done because other evidence exists that can be used to
prosecute the leadership.106 It is vitally important that the ECCC takes the moral high ground on
this issue.
F. The statutory canon of construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius
supports the contention that Article 15 of the Convention against Torture is meant
to exclude evidence gained from torture, except as to prove the existence of torture.
The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of construction that
means the inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or the alternative.107 The
United States Supreme Court has determined that this canon depends on “identifying a series of
two or more terms…which are abridged in circumstances supporting a sensible inference that the
term left out must have been meant to be excluded.”108 In other words, this construction applies
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only when the ideas are of the same associated group or subject matter so that one can justifiably
infer that an idea not mentioned was intentionally excluded.109
1. Application of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to Article 15 of the
Convention against Torture
Article 15 explicitly forbids the admission of any evidence gained from torture; “each
state party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as a result of
torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings.”110 This statement is followed by a
second, an exception to the first, that would allow the admission of information gained from
torture to be used “only against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was
made.”111 Since there are two statements of the same subject matter, banning the evidence
gathered from torture, one of which is a narrowly tailored exception to the rule, one can infer that
all other exceptions were intentionally excluded. The 1975 Declaration provided no exceptions
to the admissibility of evidence gained from torture.112 It was only during the drafting of the
CAT that an exception was included, which shows that the intention of the signatories was to
leave out all other exceptions.
Furthermore, the exception allows only that proof of the statement, not the substance of
the statement, can be admitted into evidence to prove that the statement was made under torture
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in order to prove the guilt of the alleged torturer.113 Allowing evidence gained from torture into
the ECCC’s proceedings would be to use the substance of the statements and that is not
permitted under Article 15. Additionally, some of the evidence that would be used from these
interrogations would be used to go after leaders of the Khmer Rouge, some of who had no direct
involvement in the actual torture of the victims and whose crimes are unrelated to the torture of
the victim that produced the information. This is expressly prohibited because Article 15 states
that no evidence could be submitted in “any proceedings except against a person accused of
torture as evidence that the statement was made.”114

Additionally, the 1975 Declaration

proposed that no information gained from torture could be used as evidence against “the person
concerned or against any other person in any proceedings.”115 Leading authorities on this seem
to suggest that this meaning is still implied in Article 15, 116 which would intimate that not only
could information about the Khmer Rouge command structure be excluded in proceedings
against the torturer, but also in proceedings against others who were not the torturer.
Even if Article 15 did not preclude the use of statements made as a result of torture to
prosecute suspects other than the actual torturer, such as those who ordered the torture, the
evidence at issue here is still barred. The evidence in question would be submitted in order to
establish the actual command structure of the Khmer Rouge, not to prove the torture was the
113
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result of the leadership’s order. Article 15 prohibits the substantive use of this evidence to
establish the command structure of the Khmer Rouge because the only exception in Article 15
provides for using the statements as proof that torture occurred.117 Since torture evidence is
unreliable its use here could establish a false command structure.118
Allowing the information about the command structure of the Khmer Rouge into the
proceedings at the ECCC not only violates the statutory construction of expressio unius, but it
would unjustifiably create new law. This new law would allow the admission of substantive
information gained from torture into proceedings against not only those directly responsible for
the torture of the victim, but also against others in different proceedings who were not
responsible for the torture of the victim nor any other crime against that particular victim. Such
an infusion of new law and application into Article 15 not only violates the plain meaning of the
article, but to do so would create a unilateral approach to the application of an international
treaty, and a peremptory norm, which will erode the strength of CAT and the international
condemnation of torture.
2. Two Additional Policy Reasons to Exclude Torture Evidence
Two other policy reasons exist for excluding torture evidence. First, evidence gained
from torture is considered inherently unreliable.119 A member of the Committee against Torture
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stated that torture evidence “must not be invoked under any circumstances”120 because evidence
obtained through torture is of “absolutely no value and therefore has no place in the court
file.”121 Regardless of whether some of the statements made under torture corroborate one
another, they were still made under torture and are inherently unreliable.
Second, torture has often been used to ensure evidence in judicial proceedings.

If

statements made under torture cannot be invoked, then an important reason for using torture is
removed. Even if preventing the admission of torture evidence would hinder the prosecution of
those who are responsible for facilitating the crimes of the Khmer Rouge, torture is banned
because as a peremptory norm it is fundamentally wrong. Allowing torture evidence to be
admitted into legal proceedings undermines the theory that banning evidence gained from torture
removes an important reason for using torture. 122
Ultimately, the argument that this information is necessary to prosecute the Khmer Rouge
leadership is questionable. One of the leading researchers on the atrocities committed under the
Khmer Rouge, Stephen Heder from American University, has stated that most of the confessions
obtained at Tuol Sleng are unreliable because many fabricated claims were included in them to
reinforce the party’s fear that a conspiracy actually existed.123 Additionally, Mr. Heder suggests
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that he has found evidence that would be able to be used in the ECCC that would not violate
legal proceedings or diminish the basic principles of human rights.124 Duch’s confession and
willingness to testify, coupled with the fact that one of the leading researchers on this subject
believes most of the information gained was unreliable, demonstrates that prosecutors have
available other forms of evidence to utilize in prosecuting the former leading members of the
Khmer Rouge. Because the need for this evidence is questionable, it is not worth the risk of
establishing a questionable precedent.
IV. CONCLUSION
Crafting exceptions to or analogizing around the fundamental human right to be free from
torture only creates opportunities for others to do the same, which would needlessly weaken the
CAT. The world has not determined that an exception to Article 15 of the CAT is necessary.
Creating an exception to Article 15 would set a dangerous precedent indeed.

And, if an

exception is to be created, it is up to the international community to create it, not the ECCC. It
would be tragic if the ECCC proceeded without the support of the international community and
created an exception that could undermine its legitimacy from the start.
To achieve real justice, there must be an impression of a fair trial. If the ECCC admits
evidence obtained from torture, the fairness of any trial using such evidence will be questioned.
As the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights succinctly stated: “torture is torture
whoever does it, judicial proceedings are judicial proceedings, whatever their purpose- the
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former can never be admissible in the latter.”125 Allowing evidence gained from torture into a
trial undermines the fundamental notion of fairness, which the ECCC is striving to uphold. The
risk of admitting this evidence is simply too great.
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